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This paper examines the effectiveness of public credit guarantee programs in not only increasing 
the availability of loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), but in also improving the ex-
post performance of borrowing firms. Using a unique panel data set, we identify the effects of a 
massive credit guarantee program implemented by the Japanese government from 1998-2001. 
While we do find that the availability of loans increased for program participants, when loans 
were provided by undercapitalized banks the increased liquidity persisted for only a few years. 
Further, the ex-post performance of program participants, with the exception of firms with sizable 
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Governments often rely on credit guarantees, which ensure the repayment of defaulted loans, to 
facilitate the flow of funds to small businesses. In fact, according to Green (2003), credit 
guarantee programs are employed in almost 100 countries – about half of all countries in the 
world. Further, in contrast to other similar policy measures, such as direct lending, credit 
guarantee schemes appear to be gaining momentum worldwide. 
The economic impact of credit guarantees has been examined in a variety of theoretical 
studies, including Mankiw (1986), Gale (1990, 1991), and Li (1998), to name a few.
1 Broadly, 
the justification for government intervention in credit markets is that information problems result 
in inefficiencies in SME financing. On the other hand, government intervention may exacerbate 
information problems and worsen credit conditions. 
Because of the importance, politically and in terms of financial commitment, of these 
programs, researchers from many countries, employing a variety of data sources, have 
empirically investigated the impact of these programs. Studies using aggregated data include 
Hancock and Wilcox (1998), Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2005, 2007), and Hancock, Peek, 
and Wilcox (2008). While these types of studies have provided some insight into the impact of 
credit guarantee programs, their reliance on aggregate data is a drawback. Aggregation, by 
masking the true reactions of individual firms, makes it difficult to reach a definitive conclusion 
about the effectiveness of these programs.  
Recently, an increasing number of studies using disaggregated data have attempted to 
quantitatively analyze the effectiveness of credit guarantees. On the bank-side, Wilcox and 
Yasuda (2008) find a significant increase in non-guaranteed lending after the introduction of 
government credit guarantees. Firm-level studies have been more numerous. Cowling (2007), for 
                                                 
1 Other notable papers include Smith and Stutzer (1989), Innes (1991), Williamson (1994). 
  1example, finds that firms participating in the credit guarantee program in the U.K. have a reduced 
probability of being credit rationed. Riding and Haines (2001) and Riding, Madill, and Haines 
(2007) find positive job creation and increased loan availability amongst Canadian guarantee 
program users.  
However, even these firm-level studies have data limitations. Some studies only have data 
on program participants, and some are unable to identify when firms enter into the program. 
Further, several studies rely only on cross-sectional data, meaning firm performance prior to and 
following the introduction of the program is not available. Finally, while most of the studies use 
firm data, not many also have information on each firm’s financial institutions. 
In this study, by utilizing a new and unique dataset, we are able to overcome these 
difficulties and correctly identify the effectiveness of the credit guarantee program in Japan. We 
employ a panel data set of 2,087 guarantee program users and 8,090 non-users, accompanied by 
information on each firm’s financial institutions. We also focus on a specific credit guarantee 
program, which was unprecedented in size. For a limited period of time (1998-2001), the 
Japanese government guaranteed approximately 30 trillion yen worth of loans (or about 10 
percent of total lending) to SMEs in a program officially known as the “Special Credit Guarantee 
Program for Financial Stability” (SCG program). Its intent was to alleviate the effects of a severe 
credit crunch among SMEs brought about by a contraction in the financial sector. What sets the 
SCG program apart from other credit guarantee schemes is that it was accessible by nearly all 
SMEs as long as they were not in default, were not tax delinquent, did not have significantly 
negative net worth, or were not “window-dressing” their balance sheets. In addition, the SCG 
program, like Japan’s other existing loan guarantee programs, but unlike those provided in other 
countries, covered 100 percent of the default cost incurred by borrowers. Because of this setup, 
  2the SCG program provides a unique opportunity to determine if government credit programs 
improve the availability of loans and the performance of borrower firms. 
The main contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we empirically ascertain the 
“effectiveness” of the credit guarantee scheme. In addition to considering loan availability, we 
also examine asset allocation and the ex-post performance of participating firms. To control for 
the differing characteristics of SCG users and non-users, we employ a matching estimation 
technique.  
Second, we examine how the effectiveness of the scheme was affected by the incentives it 
created for Japanese financial institutions. The program was introduced at a critical period for the 
Japanese financial system. Due to the increasing amount of non-performing loans, the amount of 
capital held by Japanese banks was precipitously low, and, as a result, the credit market was 
severely distorted. As Diamond (2001) points out, financial institutions with low levels of capital 
recalled a number of loans in order to meet the capital ratio requirement set forth by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). Under these circumstances, the SCG program had two possible, 
but contrasting outcomes. One possible outcome was that the program would help banks to 
finance projects previously unfunded due to the shortage of capital and thus increase the amount 
of loans to liquidity-constrained small businesses. The other possible outcome was that the 
program would allow undercapitalized banks to substitute non-guaranteed loans for guaranteed 
loans in order to reduce their exposure to risky loans. 
We find that while the SCG program increased the availability of loans to participants, it 
decreased their profitability. Furthermore, program participants transacting with undercapitalized 
(major) banks only experienced an increase in available liquidity for a few years at most. Thus, 
although the program successfully alleviated the credit crunch, it also allowed undercapitalized 
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reduced the incentive of lenders to require collateral, and adequately monitor these loans, which 
resulted in moral hazard, and thus exacerbated the ex-post performance of program participants. 
Only users with abundant net worth improved their ex-post performance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the credit 
guarantee system in Japan, with particular attention paid to the SCG program. In Section 3, we 
review the previous literature and posit three empirical hypotheses on the effectiveness of the 
program. Section 4 contains a discussion of the data, while in Sections 5 and 6, we test the 
hypotheses posited in Section 3 using a matching estimation approach. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2  The Special Credit Guarantee Program 
In Section 2.1, we discuss the credit guarantee scheme, one of the most important government 
credit programs in Japan. Section 2.2 contains a detailed discussion of the Special Credit 
Guarantee Program.  
2.1. The Credit Guarantee System in Japan  
To facilitate the flow of funds to SMEs, the Japanese government has implemented a 
variety of programs, including the use of direct loans by government-backed financial institutions 
as well as loan guarantees. In terms of amount outstanding, government guarantees have been 
used more extensively than direct loans. Further, the use rate of guarantees is far higher than that 
of direct loans, with nearly 40 percent of all Japanese SMEs having received guarantees. 
The credit guarantee system in Japan began in 1937 when the first credit guarantee 
corporation was established in Tokyo. After the Second World War, the system continued to 
develop. In 1948, the Japanese government established the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency 
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the guarantee system to be one of the major pillars of its SME financing policy. In 1951, the 
government began to partially insure loan guarantees, and the scheme has remained unchanged 
since. The system’s current insurer is the credit insurance division of the Japan Finance 
Corporation for Small and Medium Enterprise (JASME). The division finances 70 to 80 percent 
of the repayments by the credit guarantee corporations. The amount of guarantees outstanding 
has grown in tandem with the Japanese economy. During the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, 
the government frequently used the guarantee system as a convenient tool to stimulate activity in 
the SME sector.   
Three parties are involved in credit guarantee transactions in Japan: a small business 
borrower, a financial institution, and the credit guarantee corporation, which is financially backed 
by the government. The first step in the process is the filing of an application with a credit 
guarantee corporation. Financial institutions, acting on behalf of the small business borrower, file 
the most of the applications, although some firms file on their own behalf. In the first case, the 
financial institution may implement a preliminary screening process before it actually delivers the 
guarantee application. The second step involves the examination of, and the decision on the 
application by the guarantee corporation. Finally, based on a letter of approval from the credit 
guarantee corporation, the financial institution extends a loan to the small business. The 
borrowing firm is then required to pay a guarantee premium, which is about 1 percent of the total 
amount extended. In cases where the firm is unable to repay its debt to the bank, the corporation 
covers the debt, whereupon it receives the loan claim. The corporation then collects the claim 
over the long-term by assisting with the firm’s business restructuring. 
  5There are two additional points worth noting with regard to the guarantee system. The 
share of debt relief assumed by the guarantee corporation, as a percentage of the total loan claim 
is, in principle, 100 percent, which is unique to the Japanese guarantee system. The primary 
implication of this is that the financial institution bears no default risk, which significantly 
reduces the institution’s incentive to examine and monitor the borrower. Second, collateral or 
guarantees are sometimes required for sizable loan contracts. For example, collateral can be 
required for loans of more than 80 million yen, and a third-party guarantor can be required for 
loans of more than 50 million yen. 
2.2. Introduction of the Special Credit Guarantee Program 
In the 1990s, as the Japanese economy entered a period of prolonged stagnation, public 
guarantees were frequently included in government economic stimulus packages. This 
culminated with the introduction of the Special Credit Guarantee Program for Financial Stability, 
which ran from October 1998 to March 2001. The purpose of the measure was to alleviate the 
severe credit crunch faced by the small business sector. Beneficiaries of the program were subject 
to little in the way of collateral or third-party guarantor requirements. The scale of the SCG 
program, in terms of funding, was unprecedented. It is presumably the largest single credit 
guarantee program ever implemented in any country. Funding was initially capped at 20 trillion 
yen, but, in 1999, the cap was increased to 30 trillion yen, which was more than 10 percent of all 
SME loans outstanding in Japan. 
Another unique feature of the SCG program was its loose examination policy. An 
applicant could be rejected for a guaranteed loan only under certain conditions: significantly 
negative net worth, tax delinquency, default, or window dressing of balance sheets. Clearly, these 
were very lenient conditions and consequently most applications were approved. Hence, an 
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applications being approved, totaling 28.9 trillion yen in guaranteed loans. The amount of SME 
loans backed by guarantees is depicted in Figure 1, which clearly show that the introduction of 
the SCG program led to a significant increase in guaranteed loans. 
The program, however, has come under increasing criticism. There are two major issues. 
First, financial institutions had incentives to substitute incumbent non-guaranteed loans by loans 
guaranteed by the SCG program. In principle, the credit guarantee corporations prohibited this 
asset substitution; yet, rumors are that many financial institutions have done this. The incentive to 
substitute was even higher when the incumbent non-guaranteed loans were failing or when the 
financial institution was short of capital and needed to reduce its holdings of risky assets. 
Second, there is a concern about moral hazard. A series of media reports have exposed the 
blatant misuse of funds by some borrowing firms. Some borrowers made stock investments with 
loans guaranteed for daily company operations (Nikkei Financial Newspaper, February 16, 2000), 
others filed for bankruptcy less than one month after receiving loans (Nikkei Newspaper, January 
11, 1999), and finally some, who were in no need of financing, simply obtained the loans because 
they could (Nikkei Newspaper, January 11, 1999).  
Most of these abuses can be attributed to information problems that were worsened by the 
SCG program. Inherently, informational asymmetries exist between lenders and SMEs. Two 
features of the SCG program magnified these effects. First, due to the complete coverage of 
default costs by the credit guarantee corporation, private financial institutions had no incentive to 
properly screen or monitor their borrowers. Second, since the SCG program is less stringent with 
regard to collateral and personal guarantees than the general guarantee programs, borrowers tend 
to put in less managerial effort or take on riskier projects, which are typical symptoms of the 
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which has indeed been a major problem for Japan’s credit guarantee system. As of the end of 
October 2004, credit guarantee corporations have paid out a total of 2.1 trillion yen. Of this 
amount, whatever cannot be collected from the delinquent firms, and is not covered by the 
guarantee and insurance premium, is financed by the government budget. 
 
3  The Economic Impact of Public Credit Guarantees 
Based on the existing theoretical and empirical literature, we put forward three hypotheses about 
the economic impact of public credit guarantee programs. Specifically, we discuss loan 
availability in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, and ex-post firm performance in Section 3.3. 
3.1. Alleviating the Credit Crunch 
Much of the theoretical literature on public credit guarantee schemes focuses on the 
mechanisms by which such schemes increase loan availability. Probably the most frequently used 
explanation, à la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), concentrates on the role of asymmetric information 
between borrowers and lenders and in particular the role of hidden information, which results in  
the undersupply, or rationing, of lending in an unfettered equilibrium without government 
intervention (see, e.g., Mankiw, 1986; Gale, 1990, 1991; Innes, 1991). According to this 
explanation, the introduction of public credit guarantees results in an increase in the availability 
of loans by alleviating such hidden information problems. 
An alternative model has been developed by Li (1998). This does not rely on hidden 
information  but on hidden action  and assumes positive verification costs in determining 
borrowers’ ex-post performance, resulting in a wedge between the cost of external debt financing 
and internal financing. The consequence of the wedge is a suboptimal level of lending, which is 
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those borrowers endowed with insufficient wealth and faced with a severe liquidity constraint 
benefit the most from the guarantee scheme. 
However, one can show that even in the absence of asymmetric information, the 
introduction of credit guarantees increases the supply of loans. Models along these lines are based 
around bank capital shortages, which induce a credit crunch. Diamond (2001) builds a model 
under certainty in which banks must satisfy the capital requirement. In order to meet the 
requirement, undercapitalized banks prefer to liquidate loans to cash-constrained borrowers rather 
than waiting until the next period when cash flow will be abundant. This model actually describes 
the situation in the Japanese loan market in the late 1990s and early 2000s quite well.
2 Due to the 
credit crunch caused by the shortage of bank capital, many potentially profitable opportunities 
were not fully funded. Moreover, many undercapitalized banks terminated a large number of 
potentially profitable loans in order to satisfy the capital requirement. In this scenario, credit 
guarantees facilitate the flow of capital to fund these otherwise unfunded projects. Since banks 
need not bear the default costs of guaranteed borrowers, they are willing to finance these projects. 
Further, as Diamond (2001) implies, this additional lending effect is stronger for firms 
transacting with undercapitalized banks rather than those dealing with well-capitalized banks. To 
summarize: 
Hypothesis 1 (Availability Hypothesis)  Availability of loans increases for guarantee 
users. Furthermore, this positive effect is stronger for borrowers transacting with 
undercapitalized banks. 
                                                 
2 Ogawa (2003), Yoshikawa and Motonishi (1999), and Woo (2003) empirically verify the existence of a credit crunch during the 
period. In a comprehensive survey on the Japanese economy and its financial markets, Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) state that the 
credit crunch story applies to Japan in the years 1997-1998. 
  93.2. Loan Portfolio Substitution by the Lender 
There is an alternative hypothesis about loan availability. In contrast to most of the 
theoretical literature, which predicts an increase in the availability of guaranteed loans, empirical 
researchers, along with practitioners and policy makers, are skeptical as to whether credit 
guarantees really increase the total amount of guaranteed and non-guaranteed loans supplied to 
guarantee users. Vogel and Adams (1997) propose a situation of loan portfolio substitution by the 
lender, that is, a situation in which the increase in guaranteed loans to a firm is offset by the 
decrease in non-guaranteed loans. This is especially likely to occur when lenders perceive that the 
loan guarantees are politically motivated and unprofitable. Although this assertion lacks a rigid 
theoretical foundation, many regard their argument as persuasive and plausible.
3 In fact, this was 
one of the criticisms leveled against the SCG program in Japan.  
Note that the level of bank capital again plays an important role. A bank with a lower 
capital ratio is motivated to reduce its holdings of risky assets. Under the Basel Accord, non-
guaranteed loans have a risk weight of 100 percent, while guaranteed loans have a risk weight of 
10 percent. Therefore, undercapitalized banks are more likely to substitute guaranteed loans with 
non-guaranteed loans. Hence, borrowers transacting with undercapitalized banks are likely to 
observe a decrease in non-guaranteed loans after receiving SCG loans and to see a smaller 
increase in total loans than users transacting with well-capitalized banks. To summarize:  
                                                 
3 Wilcox and Yasuda (2008) propose another explanation for the loan portfolio substitution. They assume that the relationship 
between guaranteed and non-guaranteed loans is a function of the debt collection process. Each lender then aims to maintain the 
same level of loss given default (LGD). The model emphasizes the role of the borrower’s initial endowment in determining 
relative holdings of these two different types of loans. When the borrower has a positive endowment, guaranteed loans are likely 
to increase the lender’s LGD, since the lender must yield a portion of the initial endowment to the guarantee corporation in the 
case of default. In order to maintain a particular level of LGD, the lender will decrease non-guaranteed loans, in which case we 
observe a negative relationship between guaranteed and non-guaranteed loans. 
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firms is offset by a decrease of non-guaranteed loans, resulting in an insignificant increase 
in loan availability. Credit guarantee users transacting with undercapitalized banks 
observe a smaller increase in the availability of loans relative to those transacting with 
highly capitalized banks. 
3.3. Effects on Ex-post Performance  
The models discussed in Section 3.1 also have implications for the ex-post performance 
of borrowers. Under asymmetric information, many profitable investment opportunities are 
unfunded in the unfettered equilibrium.
4  Diamond (2001) suggests that under certainty, 
undercapitalized banks miss a number of profitable lending opportunities. The implication is that 
the financial constraint is alleviated, and the profitable projects are implemented upon the 
introduction of credit guarantees. Hence, the ex-post performance of program participants should 
improve. We call this positive effect the “investment effect.” 
Working in the opposite direction, however, is a “moral hazard effect,” which worsens the 
ex-post performance of borrowers. As previously indicated, the 100 percent coverage of default 
costs by the credit guarantee corporation reduces the incentives for financial institutions to 
adequately monitor guarantee users. As described in the credit market model presented in Freixas 
and Rochet (1997), the moral hazard problem is induced by infrequent monitoring. In addition, 
the easing of requirements on collateral and third-party guarantees in the SCG program further 
exacerbated information problems. Reduced requirements for collateral are costly to lenders. For 
                                                 
4 Note, however, that this assertion is dependent on the risk-return relationship of investment projects. Mankiw (1986) and Gale 
(1990, 1991) assume second-order stochastic dominance, in which projects with higher expected returns are not implemented in 
an unfettered pooling equilibrium. In contrast, deMeza and Webb (1987) assume first-order stochastic dominance, and conclude 
that any unfunded project has negative net present value and government intervention is not needed. 
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less likely to exert managerial effort, while Stulz and Johnson (1985) show that firms are more 
likely to sell assets to make risky investments when they do not pledge their assets as collateral. 
To summarize: 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b (Investment effect versus Moral Hazard effect) Ex-post 
performance of firms using credit guarantees improve since they are able to implement 
profitable projects with positive net present values. Alternatively, guarantee users 
succumb to moral hazard and, therefore, have lower profitability and/or a higher 
probability of falling into financial distress. 
  
4  Data and Empirical Methodology 
In this section, we discuss the data and empirical methods used, focusing, in particular, on the 
matching estimation procedure (Section 4.3).   
4.1. Data Sources 
We construct our firm-level panel data set from two sources. Our sample is based on the 
Surveys of the Financial Environment (SFE), implemented by the Small and Medium Enterprise 
Agency of Japan in the years 2001-2004. We supplement this data with information from the 
Financial Information Database (FID), which is collated by Tokyo Shoko Research, Incorporated, 
and covers the years 1998-2005. Our final data set consists of 55,588 firm-level observations 
covering the period 1998-2005.
 5  
  Our data has three primary advantages over what has been used in previous 
studies. First, by focusing on the SCG program, which was temporary, we can precisely identify 
when firms began participating in the program. Many of the existing empirical studies only have 
                                                 
5 For a detailed discussion of the construction of the panel, see the Appendix. 
  12information on whether a firm is a participant or not, without specifying when they started 
participating. Second, since the panel covers six years, we can identify both the short- and 
medium-term effects of the program. Although cross-sectional data may identify whether the 
introduction of a credit guarantee program immediately increases loan availability, there are also 
additional longer-term effects that are only identifiable with panel data. These include firm 
profitability and default probability. Finally, our data includes both borrower and bank 
characteristics, while most previous studies include only one of these two. The data set thus is not 
only able to capture the difficult financial condition of Japanese banks, but also allows us to 
evaluate how a bank’s financial situation influences the effectiveness of credit guarantee 
programs among user firms.  
4.2. Variables 
A list of the variables used in our empirical analysis and their definitions is provided in 
Table 1. We consider four categories of variables: use of the SCG program, borrower 
characteristics, characteristics of borrowers’ financial institutions, and variables describing the 
relationship between borrowers and their financial institutions. We further divide the second 
category of variables on borrower characteristics into four subcategories: loan availability, asset 
allocation, performance, and general. Table 2 presents summary statistics of these variables for 
the sample of firms for the year prior to the introduction of the SCG program. The sample is 
further subdivided into firms that eventually used the SCG program and those that did not, with 
the summary statistics for both groups also shown in Table 2. 
4.3. Empirical Approach 
Unfortunately, a simple comparison of the ex-post performance of SCG users and non-
users is not appropriate. Users of the program are generally not a random sample of the 
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also influence a firm’s ex-post performance. For example, riskier firms that cannot borrow 
without securities tend to use credit guarantees. In contrast, less risky firms that have easy access 
to credit markets prefer not to use credit guarantees since the guarantees come with additional 
costs. If the riskier group has, relative to the safer group, fewer profitable investment 
opportunities,  then a simple comparison between users and non-users results in an 
underestimation of the program’s impact. We therefore have to control for any possible selection 
bias to reduce any potential estimation biases. To do so, we employ a matching estimation 
approach. The procedure is as follows. 
(i) We first use a probit model to estimate the probability of borrowers’ participating in the SCG 
program in year t, conditional on covariates observed in the previous year, t – 1. Borrowers 
joining the program (SCGt = 1) are the treatment observations. A propensity score is then 
attached to each observation. The propensity score  ( ) e •  is defined as 
() ( 1 Pr 1 tt eX S C G X − ≡= ) 1 t −
                                                
          ( 1 )  
where Xt – 1 is a vector of firm and bank characteristics in year t – 1. 
(ii) We then identify k matched (control) observations from the non-user sample for each 
treatment observation. The control observations are the closest non-user observations to the 
treatment observation in terms of propensity score. Note that the control observations are chosen 
from the same calendar year as the treatment observation. The number of control observations, k, 
is arbitrarily determined.
6  
(iii) Finally, we compare changes in the performance variables of the treatment and the control 
group for years t-1 to t + i, where i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. 
 
6 In our estimations we use k = 5. 
  14A benefit of the matching estimation approach is that we are able match the treatment and 
control observations using the scalar propensity score. The propensity score, which is the 
conditional probability of being treated given the observed characteristics, is a very useful 
variable in dealing with a highly dimensional vector of covariates. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
show that treatment observations (in our case those who join the SCG program) and control 
observations (those who do not use it) with the same propensity score value have the same 
distribution over the full vector of covariates. In this case, in order to obtain the same probability 
distribution of the covariates for the treatment and control observations it is sufficient to match 
firms only in terms of propensity scores. 
To ensure that we have an unbiased estimator of the treatment effect, the balancing 
hypothesis must be satisfied, 
) ( | 1 1 − − ⊥ t t t X e X SCG           ( 2 )  
In other words, for a given propensity score, treatment observations are randomly chosen, and 
therefore, the treatment and non-treatment samples are on average identical. Thus, after 
implementing the first step of the matching estimation, we verify that (2) holds. The testing 
procedure entails: (i) splitting the sample such that the average propensity score of the treated and 
non-treated groups are identical, and (ii) within all intervals of the propensity score, the means of 
every element of  Xt – 1 do not differ significantly between treated and non-treated units. 
 
5  Examining the Effect of the SCG Program 
In Section 5.1, we use a probit model to estimate a propensity score for each observation. We 
then estimate the treatment effect of the SCG program in Section 5.2, while Section 5.3 includes 
several robustness checks.  
  155.1. Propensity Score Estimation 
The testing procedure begins with the propensity score estimation (Equation 1). As 
discussed previously, the propensity score is the conditional probability of participating in the 
SCG program in year t given the values of the observed borrower and bank characteristics in the 
previous year. In the estimation, the dependent variable is simply a binary variable indicating 
firm participation in the SCG program in year t (SCGt). Xt – 1 is a vector of explanatory variables, 
and consists of six groups of variables. The first group (Availability) consists of information on 
the availability of credit to a firm, the second (Allocation) describes firms’ allocation of assets, 
the third (Performance) consists of information on firm performance, the fourth (General) 
includes information on the firm’s industry, size and age, the fifth (Bank) contains bank 
characteristics, and finally the sixth (Relationship) includes information on the relationship 
between a firm and its lender. Hence, we estimate the following probit model: 
  ()
01 12 13 1
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 (3) 
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.
7 LOANRATIO, MATURITY, and RATE 
are all positive and significant. This implies that loan-dependent firms, especially those 
dependent on long-term loans, and firms with large interest payments are more likely to use the 
program. In contrast, CASH, WCAP, and FCAP are all significantly negative, indicating that 
firms with abundant liquid assets as well as fixed tangible assets are less inclined to use the 
program. ICOVER is negative and significant as well. This is not surprising, since profitable 
firms that easily cover their interest payments should be less likely to use the program.  
 
7 Note that for the given specification we verify the balancing hypothesis (Equation 2). In each of the six stratified intervals of the 
propensity score, we find that the variables employed in the propensity score estimation do not significantly differ across the 
treatment and non-treatment groups. 
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sense once we take into account that the variable is highly correlated with interest coverage. If 
interest coverage falls below the threshold value of one, the probability that the firm will join the 
program increases. In contrast, if the firm becomes insolvent (a negative capital ratio), the 
probability of joining decreases. Taken together, this implies that financially distressed firms are 
more likely to use the guarantee program, given that they are solvent.   
The signs on LnLOAN (significantly negative) and LnAGE (significantly positive), reveal 
that older and smaller borrower firms are more likely to use the SCG program. LnRELYEAR 
(negative) and NUMBANK (positive) indicate that firms with closer relationships to a financial 
institution, and those with a smaller number of alternative financial institutions to borrow from, 
are less likely to use the SCG program. Finally, we find that banks with lower levels of capital 
(BANKCAP) are more likely to participate in the program. When we consider regional financial 
institutions, however, BANKCAP is insignificant, since the coefficients for BANKCAP and 
BANKCAP*REGIONAL offset each other. This is consistent with government policy in our 
sample period: undercapitalized major banks, most of which needed to abide by the 8 percent 
capital requirement, faced severe pressure to increase their capital ratios at this time, and for these 
banks, loans fully covered by public credit guarantees were preferable to loans not guaranteed by 
the SCG scheme. In contrast, since regional financial institutions were under little pressure to 
increase their capital ratios, the incentive structure, in terms of guaranteed lending, for 
undercapitalized regional institutions was the same as for well-capitalized regional institutions. 
5.2. Treatment Effect Estimation 
To estimate the treatment effect of the SCG program, we match each treated observation 
in year t (2,087 observations) with the five nearest neighboring non-user observations in the same 
  17calendar year, where distance is measured in terms of propensity scores. We then measure the 
impact of the program on borrowers’ loan availability (LOANRATIO,  LONGRATIO, 
SHORTRATIO, and RATE), asset allocation (CASH,  WCAP, and FCAP), and performance 
(DEFAULT, CAP_NG, and ICOVER_SM). For each subsample (treatment and control) we take 
the differences for each variable between periods t + i and t – 1, where i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. For 






i t LOANRATIO LOANRATIO LOANRATIO 1 − + + − ≡ ∆ , where  { } , j Treatment Control = .
8 We then 
compare the differences across the treatment and the control groups by taking yet another 
difference. For example,  . This 




i t i t LOANRATIO LOANRATIO LOANRATIO + + + ∆ − ∆ ≡ ∆
2
The results are presented in Table 4. The treatment effect calculated across the entire 
sample is considered the base case. In the first two columns of the table, we present the means of 
the differences of each variable for the treatment and the control groups, respectively. The last 
column displays the identified treatment effect, or the difference in differences. For each variable, 
there are five estimates of the treatment effect corresponding with each of the five different time 
horizons.  
Consistent with the availability hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), there is strong evidence of a 
positive treatment effect for loan availability. SCG users, relative to non-users, experience a 
significant increase in the availability of loans. This is also true for long-term loans. Between t – 
1 and t, the LOANRATIO treatment effect ( ) is 2.1 percentage points, while the 





                                                 
8 Since we do not have data on defaults prior to year t,  ( ) 1 1
j
t p DEFAULT
+ ∆ =  is actually  ( ) 1 1
j
t p DEFAULT
+ = . 
  18horizons, the results are not qualitatively different.   is 3.7 percentage points 
and    is 1.4 percentage points. The treatment effect for short-term loans is 
generally insignificant, with one exception. The availability of long-term funds is more important 
than the availability of short-term funds for the firms’ survival. Note, however, that the SCG 
program does not have a positive effect on all of the loan procurement conditions. The treatment 




+ ∆ t LOANRATIO
4
2
+ ∆ t LONGRATIO
2
t RATE ∆   is 0.1 percentage points, with the difference increasing with the time 
horizon.  
We further find that increased leverage coincides with a moderate increase in the tangible 
fixed assets ratio, that is, ∆ is 0.3 percentage points and weakly statistically significant. In 
contrast, 
2CA ∆ d  
2
2
t FCAP  
SH +  an ti ti WCAP+ ∆ ndicate no significant treatment effects. Thus, the SCG 
program had only a minimal effect on firm asset allocation.  
 i
Finally, we turn to firm performance. SCG users have subsequent lower profitability, and 
higher probabilities of falling into financial distress. The coefficients on 
2
ti ROA + ∆  are 
significantly negative for the first three years, i.e., t,  t+1, and t+2, with -0.4, -0.4 and -0.5 
percentage points, respectively. In addition,  ( )
2 _ ti p ICOVER SM + 1 ∆ =   is always significantly 
positive, ranging between 3 and 7 percentage points. Further, resulting from the decline in 
profitability, there are more observed cases of insolvency and defaults amongst SCG participants, 
as   is significant and positive after t + 3 and  (
2 _ ti pC A P N G + ∆ ) 1 = ()
2 1 ti p DEFAULT + ∆ =  is 
significant and positive in both t + 2 and t + 3. These results, taken together, suggest that firm 
performance among SCG users deteriorated more than among non-users. Hence, in terms of our 
  19hypotheses posited above, we find evidence for a moral hazard effect (Hypothesis 3b) rather than 
for an investment effect (Hypothesis 3a).  
5.3. Robustness Check for Different Matching Algorithms 
Because there are a variety of matching algorithms, before we can be confident about our 
results, we need to examine the robustness of the treatment effect estimation across these 
different methodologies. For instance, there is a trade-off between matching quality and variance 
in the choice of how many non-user observations to match to a single treatment observation. In 
the base case, we set the number of matched non-treatment observations (k) to 5. While a one-to-
one match (k = 1) usually entails an efficiency loss, a larger k, although improving the quality of 
the match, increases bias. Moreover, there exist other matching algorithms, such as radius 
matching and kernel matching. We therefore check our base case treatment estimation by 
implementing the following matching algorithms: 10 nearest propensity score matching, kernel 
matching, and radius matching. 
  The results are displayed in Table 5. It is clear that the treatment effects do not 
qualitatively differ across the alternative matching algorithms. Positive and significant effects for 
loan availability, slightly positive and significant effects for asset allocation, and negative and 
significant effects for firm performance hold across the different methodologies. 
 
6 Treatment  Effects  across Different Subsamples 
The base case estimation in the previous section provides evidence in support of the availability 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) and the moral hazard hypothesis (Hypothesis 3b), rather than the 
substitution hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) and the investment hypothesis (Hypothesis 3a). Several 
important issues remain unresolved, however. In Section 6.1, we examine how financial 
  20institutions’ financial conditions affect the different treatment effects. In Sections 6.2 and 6.3, we 
take a closer look at exactly how the moral hazard effect overrides the investment effect amongst 
SCG users. 
6.1. Different Bank Capital Levels 
Although the base case estimation supports the loan availability hypothesis, we cannot, as 
of yet, definitively say whether the bank capital shortage positively or negatively affects the 
increased loan availability. As Hypotheses (1) and (2) make clear, the financial institution’s 
capital position matters. If Hypothesis (1) is correct, the increase in the availability of loans will 
be stronger for those firms dealing with undercapitalized banks. On the other hand, Hypothesis (2) 
predicts no significant increase in the supply of loans for firms transacting with undercapitalized 
banks. 
We proceed by subdividing the treatment observations into two groups: those transacting 
with major banks and those transacting with regional financial institutions. We choose bank type 
as the dividing criterion for two main reasons. First, all the major banks needed to abide by the 
stringent BIS capital requirement, which was set at 8 percent, since they had international 
operations. In contrast, most of the regional financial institutions did not have international 
operations and were, thus, exempt from the BIS capital requirement. They only needed to abide 
by the (looser) capital requirement of 4 percent set for domestically operating institutions. Second, 
all of the major banks, at some point in our sample period, received capital injections from the 
government. Third, even after these injections, which were meant to satisfy the BIS capital 
requirements, critics pointed out that the amount of capital injected was not sufficient for the 
major banks to satisfy the capital requirements if loans were evaluated conservatively. For these 
  21reasons, we think it reasonable to assume that major banks were more capital-constrained than 
regional financial institutions. We proceed by calculating the treatment effects for each subgroup. 
  The results are presented in the first two columns of Table 6. Interestingly, we observe a 
persistent increase in the availability of long-term loans for firms transacting with regional 
institutions. In contrast, for firms transacting with major banks the increase is short-lived. 
Moreover, the treatment effect in terms of loan availability is smaller for firms dealing with 
major banks.  
  We next further divide each of the two subsamples into quartiles depending on the bank 
capital ratio. The last columns of Table 6 display the results for the groups with banks having the 
smallest capital ratios. We find a positive and significant treatment effect, in terms of long-term 
loan availability, for SCG users borrowing from the least-capitalized major banks. This effect, 
however, is only evident in year t, and either disappears or becomes negative after t + 1. In sharp 
contrast, there is no obvious decrease in loan availability for SCG users borrowing from regional 
financial institutions regardless of the bank capital level. 
  To summarize, although the evidence is still in favor of the availability hypothesis, the 
results are mixed when guaranteed loans are extended by major banks. Bank undercapitalization 
cancels out at least part of the increased loan availability generated by the SCG program. In the 
initial period, the availability of loans increases regardless of bank type or bank capital level. The 
increased supply of (long-term) loans, however, quickly vanishes for firms borrowing from major 
banks. This effect is stronger for undercapitalized major banks. This is consistent with the 
substitution hypothesis where undercapitalized banks withdraw non-guaranteed loans when they 
extend guaranteed loans, and thus, reduce their exposure to risky assets. 
 
  226.2. Different Loan Sizes 
Understanding when the moral hazard effect (Hypothesis 3b) dominates the investment 
effect (Hypothesis 3a) is crucial to our understanding about the effectiveness of credit guarantee 
programs. Theoretically, the moral hazard effect should be more evident in cases where firm loan 
demand is small, and all the loans extended to the firm by the financial institution are covered by 
credit guarantees. If a firm’s loan demand exceeds the upper limit on guaranteed loans, which is 
200 million yen for general guarantee programs and 80 million yen for SCG program loans, 
lenders are exposed to the firm’s credit risk for the non-guaranteed portion of the loan. In this 
case, moral hazard is less likely as the bank has greater motivation to monitor the borrowing firm 
and will likely require the borrower to pledge collateral. On the other hand, if a bank’s total 
lending to a firm is covered, the bank has no incentive to properly monitor the borrower, and 
moral hazard is more likely.  
In order to ascertain whether the loan size matters for bank monitoring, we divide the base 
sample into halves, depending on a firm’s level of outstanding loans in year t – 1. The threshold 
value is approximately 400 million yen.
9 We can then determine if program users with smaller 
loan amounts succumb to moral hazard more frequently than users with larger loan amounts. 
Specifically, we calculate treatment effects, across each subsample, for the performance variables, 
as well as the firm-bank relationship variables (COLL and DOC). 
The results, presented in Table 7, show an interesting contrast between participant firms 
with small loans and participant firms with large loans. Consistent with our prediction, program 
                                                 
9 Since the threshold value of about 400 million yen exceeds the maximum amount each borrower can obtain with guaranteed 
loans, which is 280 million yen, we predict that the borrowers belonging to the group with larger loans outstanding are more 
likely to be frequently monitored by their lender. In addition, we did try other values and found that the main results are not 
sensitive to changes in this value. 
  23participants with a smaller amount of outstanding loans experienced a sizable and significant 
decrease in performance, both in terms of profitability and in terms of the probability of falling 
into financial distress. Furthermore, this deteriorating performance is accompanied by reduced 
monitoring and by a lower probability of being required to pledge collateral. In sum, we find 
significant and negative treatment effects for the ex-post performance of SCG users who take out 
smaller loans, which provides more evidence that Hypothesis (3b) (moral hazard) dominates 
Hypothesis (3a) (investment). 
6.3. Different Levels of Borrower Net Worth 
  When discussing moral hazard in this situation, a second issue must be considered: a 
firm’s net worth. As stated in Mishkin (1995), among others, the lower a firm’s net worth, the 
more severe the moral hazard problem. Owners with lower equity stakes in their firm have more 
incentive to engage in risky investment projects. To test if net worth size affects moral hazard, we 
again subdivide the base sample, but this time by firms’ capital ratio in year t – 1. 
The results are presented in Table 8. Consistent with theory, program users with smaller 
capital levels experienced a sizable and significant decrease in performance in terms of the 
probability of falling into financial distress. The probability of default and insolvency increases 
and profitability decreases at lower levels of ex-ante net worth. In contrast, at the highest ex-ante 
level of net worth, the probability of falling into financial distress falls. Thus, for program 
participants with less net worth, the moral hazard problem is exacerbated, which provides strong 
evidence in favor of Hypothesis (3b). Note, however, that the positive effects for SCG users with 
high net worth are consistent with the investment effect rather than the moral hazard effect. This 
is the only case that supports Hypothesis (3a) rather than Hypothesis (3b). 
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In this paper, we empirically examined the effect of a major government credit guarantee 
program, Japan’s Special Credit Guarantee program, on loan availability, asset allocation, and 
firms’ ex-post performance. The SCG program provides an excellent test case in that it was 
massive, temporary, and uniformly available to almost all SMEs. Using a unique panel data set of 
small businesses and financial institutions, we found that guarantee program participants, relative 
to non-participants, are met with an increase in the availability of loans. Thus, it is true that the 
introduction of the SCG program resulted in better procurement conditions. Also true, however, 
is that the increased availability of loans persisted for only a very limited period when provided 
by undercapitalized major banks. In this environment, major banks frequently used the SCG 
program to replace non-guaranteed loans with guaranteed loans in order to reduce their exposure 
to risky assets. This suggests that there were limitations to the extent with which the SCG 
program was able to stimulate bank lending when banks were heavily undercapitalized.  
We also found that the ex-post performance of program users deteriorated relative to non-
users. This result is consistent with the view that credit guarantee programs exacerbate moral 
hazard problems in credit markets. We further found this effect to be stronger for firms financed 
solely by guaranteed loans. The only exception in which the investment effect dominates the 
moral hazard effect is when the program users had an adequate amount of net worth. A larger 
amount of net worth, which proxies for more sizable default costs paid by the owner-manager of 
a firm, induces larger managerial efforts and thus reduces the moral hazard problem. 
The negative effect on profitability highlights important issues concerning the role of 
moral hazard, thus having a direct bearing on the legitimacy of  Japan’s government credit 
guarantee system. Given that the problem of moral hazard is greatest among firms that rely solely 
  25on guaranteed loans and not on non-guaranteed loans, the question arises as to how moral hazard 
can be mitigated, especially among small businesses.  
One solution is for credit guarantee programs to more frequently require collateral and/or 
personal guarantees in order to strengthen the incentives for owner-managers to exert greater 
managerial efforts. Yet, since the end of the SCG program, Japan’s credit guarantee system has 
moved in the opposite direction, becoming less reliant on collateral and/or personal guarantees. 
Aiming to facilitate the flow of funds to small and young firms with few collateralizable assets, 
the government has actually lowered requirements for collateral and third-party personal 
guarantees in the credit guarantee scheme. Our empirical results suggest that these policies may 
further exacerbate the moral hazard problem among participating firms in the program. 
Another possible solution is to lower the interest rate that credit guarantee users in Japan 
are charged. Our results indicate that the loan interest rate charged to SCG users increased by 
more than that charged to non-users, despite the fact that financial institutions did not bear any 
default risks on guaranteed loans. Thus, if an appropriate mechanism could be found to provide 
banks with an incentive to reduce interest rates on guaranteed loans, this would decrease the 
incentive for borrower firms to strategically default, another symptom of moral hazard. 
 
  26A Data  Appendix 
To adequately evaluate the SCG program it is necessary for the data to cover at least three periods. We must 
first be able to calculate the probability of participating in the SCG program in period t as a function of 
borrower and lender characteristics in period t – 1. We can then examine how a borrower’s performance 
develops between periods t-1 and t + i, where i = 0, 1, …, k. In the case of our study, we set k = 4 due to data 
availability. 
  The SCG program was implemented from October 1998 to March 2001. We identify three “windows” 
in which individual borrowers entered
10 the program: (i) October 1998 to March 1999, (ii) April 1999 to March 
2000, or (iii) April 2000 to March 2001. For those firms entering the program in period (i), we construct a data 
set for the years 1998-2003, where 1998 is year t – 1, 1999 is year t, 2000 is year t + 1, and so on. For firms 
entering in windows (ii) and (iii) we construct the samples similarly. For example, for firms entering in (ii), the 
sample covers 1999-2004, where 1999 is year t – 1, 2000 is year t, 2001 is year t + 1, and so on. Finally, we 
concatenate the three data sets into one panel data set. The initial year of the panel is t – 1, the second year as t, 
and the final year as t + 4. Dummies are included in the regressions to distinguish the three different starting 
years.  
To arrive at our final sample we implement three screens. First, observations in which one or more of 
the variables of interest falls into the upper or lower 0.5 percentile of the total distribution were omitted from 
the sample. Second, the sample is restricted to borrowers that fulfill the legal definition of SMEs. In Japan, 
SMEs are defined as firms with either 300 or fewer employees, or 300 million yen of registered capital or less. 
Finally, firms that defaulted, shut down, merged with others, or simply misreported to the credit research firm 
over the sample period are dropped from the sample from that point on. We are ultimately left with 10,177 
observations in year t – 1, with 2,087 SCG user firms and 8,090 non-user firms. Due to attrition, the number of 
observations decreases to 8,140 in year t + 4, with 1,582 SCG user firms and 6,558 non-user firms. By 
concatenating observations from year t-1 to year t+4, the total number of firm-level observations is 55,588, 
covering the period 1998-2005.  
 
                                                 
10 By “enter” we mean first make use of the program. 
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  30Table 1: Definitions of Variables 
 
Use of SCG program   





 Availability   
   LOANRATIO  Ratio of loans (long-term, short-term, bills discounted) to total assets. 
   LONGRATIO  Ratio of long-term loans (loans with more than 1 year maturity) to total 
assets. 
   SHORTRATIO  Ratio of short-term loans (loans with less than or equal to 1 year maturity) to 
total assets. 
   MATURITY  Ratio of long-term loans to the combined value of long-term and short term 
loans. 
   RATE  Ratio of interest payments to amount of loans. 
   
 Allocation   
   CASH  Ratio of cash and deposits to total assets. 
   WCAP  Ratio of working capital to total assets. 
   FCAP  Ratio of fixed tangible assets to total asset. 
   
 Performance   
   ROA  Ratio of business profits to total asset. Business profits are before interest 
payments and tax. 
   ICOVER  Ratio of business profits to interest payments. 
   CAP_NG  1 if the capital ratio is negative, 0 otherwise. 
   ICOVER_SM  1 if ICOVER is less than one, 0 otherwise. 
   DEFAULT  1 if the borrower defaults, 0 otherwise. 
   
 General   
   LnAGE  Log of the age of the borrowing firm. 
   LnLOAN  Log of loans outstanding. 
   YEARx  1 if the observation is recorded in year x, 0 otherwise. x = 1999, 2000, 2001. 
Bank characteristics   
   MAJOR  1 if the lender of the borrowing firm is either a city bank, a trust bank, or a 
long-term credit bank, 0 otherwise. 
   REGIONAL  1 if the lender of the borrowing firm is either a regional bank, a second-tier 
regional bank, a shinkin bank, or a credit union, 0 otherwise. 
   BANKCAP  Bank’s capital ratio. 
   
Relationship      
   LnRELYEAR  Log of the number of years the borrower firm has been transacting with its 
main bank. 
   NUMBANK  Number of banks the borrower firm is transacting with. 
   DOC  Index variable indicating the frequency of document submissions to the 
borrower’s main bank: 1: annually, 2: semi-annually, 3: quarterly, 4: once 
every 1-2 months. 
   COLL  1 if the borrower pledges collateral to the main bank, 0 otherwise. 
  31Table 2: Summary Statistics
All SCG=1 SCG=0
Mean Mean Mean
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
Availability
LOANRATIO 0.394 0.498 0.367
(0.231) (0.211) (0.229) 
LONGRATIO 0.250 0.317 0.231
(0.187) (0.189) (0.183) 
SHORTRATIO 0.189 0.212 0.183
(0.158) (0.161) (0.157) 
MATURITY 0.563 0.616 0.549
(0.328) (0.283) (0.337) 
RATE 0.027 0.030 0.027
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) 
Allocation
CASH 0.171 0.162 0.174
(0.120) (0.109) (0.123) 
WCAP 0.132 0.126 0.133
(0.161) (0.177) (0.157) 
FCAP 0.308 0.299 0.310
(0.196) (0.199) (0.195) 
Performance
ROA 0.023 0.015 0.026
(0.053) (0.051) (0.054) 
ICOVER 8.847 1.697 10.692
(48.593) (8.030)  (54.197) 
ROA_NG 0.213 0.262 0.200
(0.409) (0.440) (0.400) 
CAP_NG 0.045 0.076 0.037
(0.208) (0.265) (0.189) 
ICOVER_SM 0.360 0.494 0.325
(0.480) (0.500) (0.468) 
DEFAULT 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.033) (0.044) (0.029) 
General
Ln AGE 3.376 3.279 3.401
(0.574) (0.589) (0.568) 
Ln LOAN 12.781 12.821 12.771
(1.593) (1.376) (1.644) 
YEAR 1999 0.444 0.693 0.379
(0.497) (0.461) (0.485) 
YEAR 2000 0.314 0.219 0.338
(0.464) (0.414) (0.473) 
YEAR 2001 0.243 0.088 0.283
(0.429) (0.283) (0.450) 
Bank characteristics
MAJOR 0.329 0.324 0.331
(0.470) (0.468) (0.471) 
REGIONAL 0.671 0.676 0.669
(0.470) (0.468) (0.471) 
BANKCAP 0.100 0.096 0.101
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
Relationship
Ln RELYEAR 3.196 3.048 3.235
(0.710) (0.787) (0.683) 
NUMBANK 4.027 4.457 3.916
(3.362) (3.308) (3.367) 
DOC 1.762 2.085 1.719
(1.067) (1.239) (1.035) 
COLL 0.784 0.896 0.769
(0.412) (0.305) (0.422) 
N 10,177 2,087 8,090
Note 1: Variables are measured in year t-1.
Note 2: DEFAULT, DOC, and COLL do not have values for year t-1 and the values shown are for year t+1.




LOANRATIO 1.937 (0.098)  ***
MATURITY 0.341 (0.054)  ***
RATE 5.017 (0.888)  ***
Allocation
CASH -0.655 (0.156)  ***
WCAP -0.573 (0.107)  ***
FCAP -1.060 (0.104)  ***
Performance
ROA 1.048 (0.460)  **
ICOVER -0.008 (0.002)  ***
ROA_NG -0.024 (0.053) 
CAP_NG -0.312 (0.074)  ***
ICOVER_SM 0.245 (0.045)  ***
General
Ln LOAN -0.123 (0.016)  ***
Ln AGE 0.084 (0.035)  **
YEAR1999 0.518 (0.039)  ***
YEAR2001 -0.276 (0.050)  ***
Bank
BANKCAP -6.692 (2.574)  ***
REGIONAL -0.715 (0.276)  ***
REGIONAL*BANKCAP 5.742 (2.679)  **
Relationship
Ln RELYEAR -0.127 (0.027)  ***
NUMBANK 0.027 (0.005)  ***
CONS 0.370 (0.388) 
Industrial Dummies Yes
N1 0 , 1 7 7
Pseudo R-sq 0.165
Log Likelihood -4,313.121
Note 1: ***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Note 2: The dependent variable is measured in year t, while explanatory variables are for year t-1.  
  33Table 4: Treatment Effect (Base Case)
Treatment Control Treatment Control
LOANRATIO t-1 0.498 0.500 ROA t-1 0.015 0.013
t 0.516 0.497 0.021 *** t 0.014 0.016 -0.004 ***
t+1 0.509 0.487 0.023 *** t+1 0.018 0.021 -0.004 ***
t+2 0.502 0.477 0.025 *** t+2 0.018 0.021 -0.005 ***
t+3 0.503 0.472 0.031 *** t+3 0.019 0.017 0.000
t+4 0.494 0.459 0.037 *** t+4 0.023 0.021 -0.002
LONGRATIO t-1 0.317 0.322 p(DEFAULT=1)
t 0.343 0.326 0.022 ***
t+1 0.336 0.321 0.021 *** t+1 0.002 0.001 0.001
t+2 0.325 0.310 0.020 *** t+2 0.005 0.002 0.003 *
t+3 0.326 0.314 0.015 *** t+3 0.026 0.011 0.015 ***
t+4 0.320 0.307 0.014 *** t+4 0.019 0.016 0.003
SHORTRATIO t-1 0.212 0.225 p(CAP_NG=1) t-1 0.076 0.071
t 0.208 0.221 -0.004 * t 0.081 0.076 0.000
t+1 0.211 0.216 0.001 t+1 0.087 0.074 0.005
t+2 0.213 0.220 0.002 t+2 0.074 0.063 0.009
t+3 0.215 0.220 0.004 t+3 0.078 0.056 0.024 ***
t+4 0.211 0.214 0.007 t+4 0.076 0.052 0.031 ***
RATE t-1 0.030 0.030 p(ICOVER_SM=t-1 0.494 0.507
t 0.028 0.028 0.001 *** t 0.493 0.436 0.073 ***
t+1 0.028 0.027 0.002 *** t+1 0.435 0.394 0.055 ***
t+2 0.028 0.026 0.002 *** t+2 0.423 0.388 0.055 ***
t+3 0.027 0.025 0.003 *** t+3 0.420 0.412 0.029 *
t+4 0.027 0.025 0.003 *** t+4 0.374 0.363 0.040 **
CASH t-1 0.162 0.163
t 0.165 0.166 0.000
t+1 0.161 0.164 -0.001
t+2 0.162 0.162 0.000
t+3 0.159 0.158 0.001
t+4 0.158 0.155 0.002
WCAP t-1 0.126 0.123
t 0.132 0.126 0.003
t+1 0.128 0.129 -0.004
t+2 0.131 0.132 -0.002
t+3 0.137 0.135 0.005
t+4 0.142 0.133 0.010 ***
FCAP t-1 0.299 0.306
t 0.300 0.306 0.003 *
t+1 0.303 0.308 0.004 *
t+2 0.305 0.309 0.003
t+3 0.314 0.318 0.002
t+4 0.311 0.322 -0.003
Note 1: ***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Note 2: The treatment effect for each variable is shown in the "Diff. in Diff." column. For example, the treatment effect for LOANRATIO is defined as
The only exception is the variable p(DEFAULT=1). Since the variable starts from t+1 and not from t-1, we define its treatment effect as
Note 3: For each variable, the number of observations differs between t-1 and t+i due to the attrition of observations.
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  34Table 5: Treatment Effect (Base Case with Other Matching Techniques)
LOANRATIO t-1 ROA t-1
t 0.021 *** 0.021 *** 0.021 *** t -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.005 ***
t+1 0.023 *** 0.022 *** 0.023 *** t+1 -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 ***
t+2 0.028 *** 0.026 *** 0.025 *** t+2 -0.005 *** -0.004 *** -0.005 ***
t+3 0.035 *** 0.033 *** 0.033 *** t+3 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
t+4 0.038 *** 0.037 *** 0.035 *** t+4 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
LONGRATIO t-1 p(DEFAULT=1)
t 0.021 *** 0.021 *** 0.021 ***
t+1 0.021 *** 0.022 *** 0.023 *** t+1 0.001 0.002 0.002 *
t+2 0.022 *** 0.022 *** 0.024 *** t+2 0.002 0.002 0.002
t+3 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 *** t+3 0.016 *** 0.016 *** 0.015 ***
t+4 0.015 *** 0.015 *** 0.016 *** t+4 0.002 0.002 0.001
SHORTRATIOt-1 p(CAP_NG=1t-1
t -0.003 -0.004 ** -0.005 ** t 0.001 0.000 0.001
t+1 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 * t+1 0.006 0.004 0.005
t+2 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 t+2 0.008 0.006 0.007
t+3 0.006 0.002 0.001 t+3 0.022 *** 0.018 *** 0.020 ***
t+4 0.008 ** 0.005 0.004 t+4 0.030 *** 0.026 *** 0.025 ***
RATE t-1 p(ICOVER_SM t-1
t 0.001 * 0.000 0.000 t 0.071 *** 0.065 *** 0.071 ***
t+1 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** t+1 0.051 *** 0.042 *** 0.051 ***
t+2 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** t+2 0.049 *** 0.044 *** 0.049 ***
t+3 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** t+3 0.039 ** 0.034 ** 0.034 **
t+4 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** t+4 0.040 ** 0.025 * 0.031 **
CASH t-1
t -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
t+1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
t+2 0.000 0.000 0.000
t+3 0.000 0.000 0.000
t+4 0.002 0.001 0.001
WCAP t-1
t 0.004 * 0.003 0.003
t+1 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
t+2 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
t+3 0.006 * 0.003 0.003
t+4 0.010 *** 0.006 ** 0.006 *
FCAP t-1
t 0.002 ** 0.003 *** 0.003 ***
t+1 0.003 * 0.004 ** 0.004 **
t+2 0.003 0.004 * 0.005 **
t+3 0.001 0.003 0.003
t+4 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
Note 1: ***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Note 2: The treatment effect for each variable is shown in the "Diff. in Diff." column. For example, the treatment effect for LOANRATIO is defined as
The only exception is the variable p(DEFAULT=1). Since the variable starts from t+1 and not from t-1, we define its treatment effect as
Note 3: For each variable, the number of observations differs between t-1 and t+i due to the attrition of observations.
k=10 Kernel Radius
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LOANRATIO t 0.018 *** 0.023 *** 0.019 ** 0.020 ***
t+1 0.018 *** 0.026 *** 0.018 * 0.024 ***
t+2 0.022 *** 0.026 *** 0.017 0.022 ***
t+3 0.024 *** 0.034 *** 0.005 0.027 ***
t+4 0.018 ** 0.047 *** 0.009 0.045 ***
LONGRATIO t 0.014 *** 0.026 *** 0.018 ** 0.023 ***
t+1 0.012 ** 0.025 *** -0.005 0.022 ***
t+2 0.011 0.024 *** -0.014 0.026 ***
t+3 0.007 0.019 *** -0.008 0.012
t+4 -0.002 0.023 *** -0.010 0.018 **
SHORTRATIO t 0.001 -0.007 ** 0.004 -0.005
t+1 0.006 -0.001 0.031 *** 0.000
t+2 0.008 -0.001 0.027 *** -0.003
t+3 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.003
t+4 0.002 0.009 * 0.010 0.008
RATE t 0.002 *** 0.000 0.001 0.002 ***
t+1 0.003 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 0.002 ***
t+2 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 0.005 ***
t+3 0.005 *** 0.002 *** 0.003 ** 0.005 ***
t+4 0.006 *** 0.002 *** 0.003 ** 0.004 ***
Note 1: ***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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LOANRATIO t 0.029 *** 0.013 *** ROA t -0.007 *** 0.000
t+1 0.034 *** 0.013 *** t+1 -0.007 *** -0.002
t+2 0.031 *** 0.019 *** t+2 -0.010 *** 0.000
t+3 0.042 *** 0.021 *** t+3 -0.004 0.002
t+4 0.052 *** 0.025 *** t+4 -0.004 0.000
LONGRATIO t 0.033 *** 0.011 *** p(DEFAULT=1)
t+1 0.029 *** 0.013 *** t+1 0.002 0.001
t+2 0.031 *** 0.010 ** t+2 0.006 ** -0.001
t+3 0.027 *** 0.005 t+3 0.016 *** 0.015 ***
t+4 0.029 *** 0.003 t+4 -0.001 0.007
SHORTRATIOt -0.008 ** -0.001 p(CAP_NG=1t 0.005 -0.006
t+1 0.004 -0.001 t+1 0.010 0.001
t+2 0.002 0.002 t+2 0.012 0.006
t+3 0.013 ** -0.001 t+3 0.037 *** 0.013
t+4 0.011 0.004 t+4 0.042 *** 0.021 **
RATE t 0.000 0.002 *** p(ICOVER_SM t 0.078 *** 0.067 *
t+1 0.001 0.002 *** t+1 0.075 *** 0.035
t+2 0.001 0.003 *** t+2 0.081 *** 0.032
t+3 0.002 ** 0.004 *** t+3 0.076 *** -0.012
t+4 0.001 * 0.005 *** t+4 0.069 *** 0.015









t+4 0.015 ** 0.007





DOC t+1 -0.067 0.655 *** COLL t+1 0.028 0.133 ***
t+2 -0.155 *** 0.623 *** t+2 0.029 ** 0.126 ***
t+3 -0.108 * 0.636 *** t+3 -0.002 0.122 ***
t+4 -0.152 * 0.509 *** t+4 0.051 *** 0.117 ***
Note 1: ***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Note 2: The treatment effect for each variable is shown in the "Diff. in Diff." column. For example, the treatment effect for LOANRATIO is defined as
The only exception is the variable p(DEFAULT=1). Since the variable starts from t+1 and not from t-1, we define its treatment effect as
Note 3: For each variable, the number of observations differs between t-1 and t+i due to the attrition of observations.
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LOANRATIO t 0.021 *** 0.024 *** 0.018 *** 0.017 ** ROA t -0.001 -0.005 *** -0.005 ** -0.003
t+1 0.025 *** 0.029 *** 0.016 ** 0.017 * t+1 -0.002 -0.007 *** -0.006 ** -0.002
t+2 0.030 *** 0.028 *** 0.018 ** 0.009 t+2 -0.002 -0.007 *** -0.006 * -0.002
t+3 0.040 *** 0.031 *** 0.020 ** 0.020 * t+3 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
t+4 0.055 *** 0.038 *** 0.018 * 0.021 t+4 0.000 -0.004 * -0.001 -0.001
LONGRATIO t 0.024 *** 0.028 *** 0.016 *** 0.009 p(DEFAULT=1)
t+1 0.026 *** 0.027 *** 0.009 0.009 t+1 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.000
t+2 0.030 *** 0.024 *** 0.000 0.011 t+2 0.006 ** 0.002 0.000 -0.001
t+3 0.020 *** 0.016 ** 0.004 0.022 ** t+3 0.029 *** 0.010 * 0.009 -0.004 **
t+4 0.028 *** 0.015 ** -0.011 0.025 ** t+4 0.013 * -0.003 -0.005 0.004
SHORTRATIOt -0.007 * -0.005 0.002 -0.005 p(CAP_NG=1t 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.007 **
t+1 -0.003 0.002 0.009 * -0.001 t+1 0.003 0.009 0.009 -0.006
t+2 -0.002 0.006 0.007 -0.011 t+2 -0.006 0.027 *** 0.012 * -0.005
t+3 -0.001 0.005 0.013 * 0.000 t+3 0.011 0.044 *** 0.028 *** -0.005
t+4 0.010 0.005 0.009 -0.010 t+4 0.029 0.043 *** 0.032 *** -0.006
RATE t 0.002 *** 0.001 0.000 -0.002 p(ICOVER_SM t 0.073 *** 0.104 *** 0.068 *** -0.042
t+1 0.003 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 -0.002 t+1 0.046 * 0.112 *** 0.038 -0.078
t+2 0.003 *** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.000 t+2 0.033 0.111 *** 0.041 -0.025
t+3 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** -0.001 t+3 0.010 0.074 *** 0.027 -0.057
t+4 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.001 0.002 t+4 0.014 0.115 *** 0.007 -0.042
CASH t -0.006 *** 0.006 ** -0.004 0.008
t+1 -0.006 ** 0.001 -0.003 0.015 **
t+2 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.016 **
t+3 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.022 ***
t+4 -0.002 -0.003 0.008 0.023 **
WCAP t 0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.016 **
t+1 -0.001 -0.014 *** 0.000 0.007
t+2 0.000 -0.009 * 0.003 0.005
t+3 0.010 * -0.005 0.010 0.001
t+4 0.012 * 0.004 0.016 ** 0.011
FCAP t 0.007 *** 0.003 -0.003 -0.004
t+1 0.007 ** 0.006 * -0.002 0.000
t+2 0.006 0.011 ** -0.010 * -0.007
t+3 0.001 0.011 ** -0.008 -0.007
t+4 0.001 -0.001 -0.012 * -0.008
Note 1: ***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Note 2: The treatment effect for each variable is shown in the "Diff. in Diff." column. For example, the treatment effect for LOANRATIO is defined as
The only exception is the variable p(DEFAULT=1). Since the variable starts from t+1 and not from t-1, we define its treatment effect as
Note 3: For each variable, the number of observations differs between t-1 and t+i due to the attrition of observations.
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